United Nations S/2013/413 Security Council.

United Nations S/2013/413
Security Council
Distr.: General
12 July 2013
Original: English
13-36185 (E) 150713
*1336185*
Letter dated 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the
Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with
paragraph 13 (m) of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), I have the honour to
transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter,
together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the
Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Kim Sook
Chairman
Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea
S/2013/413
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Letter dated 19 June 2013 from the members of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
We have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, in accordance with paragraph 13 (m) of
Security Council resolution 2060 (2012).
(Signed) Jarat Chopra
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
(Signed) Jeanine Lee Brudenell
Finance Expert
(Signed) Emmanuel Deisser
Arms Expert
(Signed) Aurélien Llorca
Transport Expert
(Signed) Dinesh Mahtani
Finance Expert
(Signed) Jörg Roofthooft
Maritime Expert
(Signed) Babatunde Taiwo
Armed Groups Expert
(Signed) Kristèle Younès
Humanitarian Expert
S/2013/413
13-361853Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia
Contents
Page
Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C. Spoiler networks in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
E. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
III. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A. Arms shipments to Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B. Foreign military operations in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. Non-compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
D. Private security companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A. Denial of access and attacks on aid workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C. Best practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
V. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A. Attacks on civilians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B. Gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. Child soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D. Forcible displacement or confinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
VI. Violations of the ban on charcoal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
VII. Obstruction of the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
VIII. Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
IX. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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Annexes*
1. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.1. Al-Shabaab areas of control and influence, and security incidents related to Al-Shabaab. . 48
1.2. Al-Shabaab structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.3. Al-Shabaab recruitment and training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.4. Foreign fighters with Al-Shabaab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.5. Al-Shabaab tactics, techniques and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1.6. Al-Shabaab media strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.7. Case study: Al-Shabaab in “Puntland” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.1. Al Hijra (formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3. Spoiler networks in Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.1. Spoiler networks in northern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.2. Spoiler networks in central Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.3. Spoiler networks in southern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.4. Spoiler networks and the Somali security services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4. Piracy and kidnap for ransom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.1. Fleeing pirates after a failed attack (2 April 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.2. President of Somalia letter of 28 February 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.3. Ship Security Certificate (Mogadishu) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.4. Pirate financier** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1364.5. Pirate negotiator** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.6. Pirate negotiator** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.7. Pirate facilitator**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.8. Pirate facilitator**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.9. Pirate negotiator** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.10. Pirate network linkages** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5. Misappropriation of public financial resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.1. Corruption during the 2012 end of transition process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2. Public financial mismanagement and corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.3. Passport production, corruption and fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.4. Mogadishu port revenue diversion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.5. Somalia’s petroleum sector: threats to peace and security and corruption risks . . . . . . . . 241
S/2013/413
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6. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
6.1. Arms shipments to Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
6.2. Non-compliant States and organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
6.3. Private security companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
7. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
7.1. Denial of access and attacks on aid workers**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
7.2. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
8. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
8.1. Attacks on civilians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
8.2. Gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
9. Violations of the ban on charcoal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
9.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
9.2. Somali charcoal exportation and trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
9.3. Vessels that have exported charcoal from Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.
** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
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Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
ENDF Ethiopian National Defence Forces
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
KDF Kenya Defence Forces
MSF Médecins san Frontières
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
S/2013/413
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Summary
The end of transition in Somalia in summer 2012, though fragile and flawed,
nevertheless led to the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President and
presented an opportunity for a new kind of leadership in the country. However, a
genuine end of transition necessitated both a change in individual leadership as well
as a change in the system of government that in the past had undermined the Statebuilding
enterprise through misappropriation of public goods and security sector
fiefdoms. While control over financial flows and security institutions was divided
between several principal power holders in the past, the new President inherited a
system in which he controlled neither. While struggling to extend his reach into
government in Mogadishu as well as into the country generally, he has had to
develop coping mechanisms to obtain external funds and arrange security relations
inside and outside of Government. These limitations at the centre of the Federal
Government, the realignment of networks of influence in and around it and morebroadly in Somalia, as well as events in past months, notably in “Jubaland”, threaten
to undermine the Federal Government of Somalia and the current peace and
reconciliation process in the country.
Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab has suffered conventional military setbacks,
particularly in urban centres, including the loss of Kismaayo, as the forces of
AMISOM and the Somali National Army expanded their areas of territorial control.
However, Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin continues to control most of southern
and central Somalia and has shifted its strategic posture to asymmetrical warfare in
both urban centres and the countryside. The military strength of Al-Shabaab, with an
approximately 5,000-strong force, remains arguably intact in terms of operational
readiness, chain of command, discipline and communication capabilities. By
avoiding direct military confrontation, it has preserved the core of its fighting force
and resources. Given its structure, internal dissension has had no impact on
Al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct operations. The leadership of Ahmed Godane has
been kept largely unchallenged, in part by strengthening the role and resources of
Amniyat, Al-Shabaab’s “secret service”, which is structured along the lines of a
clandestine organization within the organization with the intention of surviving any
kind of dissolution of Al-Shabaab. At present, Al-Shabaab remains the principal
threat to peace and security in Somalia.
The merger between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in 2012 appears largely
symbolic. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a regional and international threat through
its affiliates. Notably, in Kenya, Al Hijra (formerly the Muslim Youth Centre) and its
financier, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee, have suffered setbacks from
disruptions of Al Hijra’s operations by international and regional security services, as
well as unexplained killings and disappearances of its members. However, Al Hijra is
striving to regain the initiative, in part through its fighters in Somalia returning to
conduct new and more complex operations and through strengthening its ties to other
groups in the region. In this context, the self-styled Al-Qaida affiliate, Abubakar
Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi”, designated for targeted measures by the Committee in
August 2012, is increasingly asserting his influence over Al Hijra.
More broadly in Somalia, several spoiler networks have emerged. In northern
Somalia, with the general decline of pirate activity a network of individuals,
including known pirate leaders, is engaged in providing private security for
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unlicensed fishing vessels in Somali waters and is connected to weapons smuggling
and Al-Shabaab networks in north-eastern Somalia. In the east-central region of
Galmudug, a “former” Mogadishu warlord, Abdi Hassan Awale “Qeybdiid”, has
returned to prominence by appropriating political power and instigating clan conflict,
thereby undermining the Federal Government and threatening security in the
northern region of “Puntland”. In southern Somalia, two core groups of spoilers are
either aligned against or in favour of the Federal Government. Sheikh Ahmed
Mohamed Islam “Madobe” and his Ras Kamboni forces, with Kenyan support, have
established their own military presence in Kismaayo in opposition to the central
Government, while a group of Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Ayr warlords and their allies in
the Darod/Marehan network of Barre Adan Shire “Hiiraale” are acting as proxies for
the central Government, but pursing their own individual and clan-based agendas.
Both spoiler groups have interests that intersect with those of Al-Shabaab.
With the decline in the number of pirate incidents, organized criminal networks
and individuals are diversifying their financial interests by undertaking different
ventures, including providing armed protection aboard vessels involved in regional
trade or fishing activities. While piracy may be contained at sea, the various pirate
networks remain active. In the persisting absence of serious national and
international efforts to investigate, prosecute or sanction those responsible for
organizing Somali piracy, the leaders, financiers, negotiators and facilitators will
continue to operate with impunity. Of particular concern in this context are the steps
taken by the Federal Government towards a policy of amnesty.
Despite the change in leadership in Mogadishu, the misappropriation of publicresources continues in line with past practices. The campaign financing structure of
the 2012 elections recycled funds derived from external and internal sources to
distort the political system. Notably, public financial management efforts to redirect
Government revenues to the Central Bank proved to be serving a flawed objective.
On average, some 80 per cent of withdrawals from the Central Bank are made for
private purposes and not for the running of Government, representing a patronage
system and a set of social relations that defy the institutionalization of the State. In
this context, the fiduciary agency managed by PricewaterhouseCoopers was reduced
to a transfer agent that could not ensure accountability of funds once they reached
the Government of Somalia. Indeed, of 16.9 million transferred by
PricewaterhouseCoopers to the Central Bank, US$ 12 million could not be traced.
Key to these irregularities has been the current Governor of the Central Bank,
Abdusalam Omer. In addition, the production of the national passport continues to be
fraught with fraud and corruption, undermining the integrity of the national travel
document. While more customs and port fee revenues from Mogadishu port have
been deposited into the Central Bank, they are proportionally less than the increase
in shipping traffic, and a monthly average of at least 33 per cent cannot be accounted
for. At present, the emergence of significant oil interests in Somalia and the region
risks exacerbating political tensions in Somalia, undermining coordination between
federal and regional administrations and threatening peace and security in the
country.
Despite the relaxation of the arms embargo for the Federal Government of
Somalia, a variety of violations persist. The patterns of arms shipments to Somalia
remain similar to those of previous years, with smuggling networks able to exploit a
number of small ports around the coast of Somalia and supply routes between the
northern and southern parts of the country. In addition, concerns over command and
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control within AMISOM and Kenyan forces, as well as support to Somali proxies by
the Government of Ethiopia outside any exemption, remain unresolved issues.
Generally, there has been an improvement by Member States in complying with
procedures of the arms embargo, although the Federal Government has yet to fulfil
its obligations under the revised regime. The activities of private security companies
continue to grow, at times in violation of the arms embargo.
Despite improved access in certain areas of the country, access to vulnerable
civilians remains a challenge for the humanitarian community, and all parties in
Somalia continue to obstruct the provision of humanitarian assistance. Al-Shabaab
maintained and expanded its ban on most aid agencies in areas under its control,
while all actors in Somalia subjected humanitarian organizations to taxation, illegal
roadblocks, intimidation and extortion. Moreover, as a consequence of both remote
management by aid agencies in Nairobi and the culture of “gatekeepers”, diversion
of humanitarian assistance by third parties, as well as by staff and partners of aid
organizations, continues to undermine international efforts.
Throughout Somalia, all parties to the conflict continue to violate international
humanitarian law and human rights standards. Military operations and guerrilla
warfare across the country caused significant harm to civilians. In 2012 in
Mogadishu, some 6,680 civilian casualties suffered weapons-related injuries, many
of them from improvised explosive devices deployed by Al-Shabaab. Data collected
by human rights and humanitarian agencies demonstrate that pro-Government forces
have also caused civilian casualties as a result of aerial attacks and naval and ground
engagement. Meanwhile, gender-based violence remains an endemic phenomenon.
By November 2012, Kenyan forces, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe and his Ras
Kamboni forces had unilaterally begun exporting charcoal from Kismaayo in flagrant
violation of the Security Council ban and the instructions of the President of
Somalia. Thereafter, approximately 1 million sacks of charcoal have been exported
from Kismaayo each month, in addition to exports from Al-Shabaab-controlled
Barawe and other smaller ports. Overall, the charcoal exports have increased by
140 per cent in comparison to previous years. The charcoal business architecture andtrade networks remain intact, with Al-Shabaab maintaining a central role and
continuing to benefit significantly.
As a result of its investigations, particularly those with financial implications
for spoilers in Somalia, the Monitoring Group has experienced increasing obstruction
of its work, including targeted killings, threats and intimidation of its alleged
sources. In addition, as Somalia proceeds on its precarious path to peace and
reconciliation, the various spoilers identified by the Monitoring Group threaten to
undermine legitimate authority in the country as well as international assistance
efforts. To better secure the gains made to date, the Monitoring Group believes that
such individuals violating relevant Security Council resolutions should be designated
for targeted measures with the least possible delay. To this end, it proposes several
new additions to the sanctions lists established in accordance with Security Council
resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009).
S/2013/413
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I. Introduction
A. Mandate
1. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is contained in
paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), adopted on 25 July 2012.
Additional tasks were assigned to the Monitoring Group under resolution 2093
(2013).
2. Pursuant to paragraph 13 (l) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group
provided the Security Council, through its Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, a midterm briefing on
15 February 2013. The Monitoring Group also submitted monthly progress reports
to the Committee throughout the period of its mandate.
3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group
travelled to Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Switzerland, Sweden, the United
Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Yemen and
Zambia. In Somalia, members of the Monitoring Group were able to undertake
multiple visits to Mogadishu, Garowe, Bosasso and Kismaayo, but much of the
south of the country remained inaccessible.
4. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following
experts: Jarat Chopra (Coordinator), Jeanine Lee Brudenell (finance), Emmanuel
Deisser (arms), Aurélien Llorca (transport), Dinesh Mahtani (finance), Jörg
Roofthooft (maritime), Babatunde Taiwo (armed groups) and Kristèle Younès
(humanitarian).
B. Methodology
5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous
reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the mandate under
review. The Monitoring Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous
reports (most recently, S/2012/544 of 13 July 2012). The methodology used for the
current report is as follows:
(a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where
possible;
(b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of
events, where possible;
(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing
knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant
expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with
respect to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources; and
(e) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary
evidence in support of the information collected.
S/2013/413
13-36185116. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access
to those involved in violations by way of individuals who have direct knowledge or
who know people who have direct knowledge about details of violations. On certain
occasions, the Monitoring Group was able to witness first-hand active violations.
7. The Monitoring Group interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant
information, including government officials and representatives from diplomatic
missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. Members of the Monitoring
Group met with a variety of officials of the Federal Government of Somalia,
including the President, Prime Minister and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Finance and Planning, among others, and security agencies. The Monitoring Group
also met or communicated with officials from the “Puntland” and “Somaliland”
administrations, representatives of other political and armed groups, defectors and
members of business communities and Somali civil society.
8. In conformity with guidance provided by the Committee, the Monitoring
Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in
its final report. However, General Assembly resolutions on the control and
limitation of documentation, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265,
necessitated the extensive use of annexes, preventing much of the substance from
being translated. In addition, regulations exclude the insertion of maps, photographs
and charts in the main report.
9. In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin entitled “Information
sensitivity, classification and handling” (ST/SGB/2007/6) of 12 February 2007, the
Monitoring Group has submitted to the Security Council Committee on Somalia and
Eritrea, together with the present report, several strictly confidential annexes
containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper
functioning of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third
parties or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations. These annexes will not
be issued as a document of the Security Council.
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability
of Somalia1
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
10. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) remains the principal threat
to peace and security in Somalia. During the reporting period, the organization has
claimed responsibility for hundreds of assassinations and attacks involving
improvised explosive devices of different types (person-borne, vehicle-borne,
suicide vehicle-borne, radio-controlled, and victim-operated), ambushes, mortar
shelling, grenades and hit-and-run tactics. Al-Shabaab is also responsible for
continuous violations of the arms embargo on Somalia and the ban on the export of
charcoal (see annexes 6 and 9 to the present report).
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1By paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1844 (2008), the Security Council prohibited acts that threaten
the peace, security or stability of Somalia. By paragraph 43 (a) of resolution 2093 (2013), the
Council included among the prohibited acts those that threaten the peace and reconciliation
process in Somalia or threaten the Federal Government of Somalia or AMISOM by force. By
paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011), the Council expanded the scope of prohibited acts to
include the misappropriation of public financial resources.
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11. Al-Shabaab’s operations have targeted AMISOM forces, United Nations staff
and premises, members of the security sector institutions of the Government of
Somalia and “Puntland” and, to a lesser extent, other regional entities, but also
Somali journalists, elders, politicians, judges, businessmen and civil society
activists. These operations have caused hundreds of civilian casualties, including
women and children and foreigners.
12. At present, Al-Shabaab remains in control of most of southern and central
Somalia, including the entire region of Middle Juba, most of Hiran, Bay and Bakol
regions and sizeable parts of Galgadud and Lower and Middle Shabelle regions.
Multiple factors explain the resilience of Al-Shabaab, including longstandingsupport from some major clans, the capacity to provide a stable environment for
business, livestock farming and agricultural production and the ability to represent
for local elders a credible alternative to regional warlordism or to Mogadishu-based
institutions, still perceived as a source of instability, violence and corruption.
13. The Monitoring Group considers, on the basis of its analysis of confidential
intelligence reports, that the military strength of Al-Shabaab, with an approximately
5,000-strong force, remains arguably intact in terms of operational readiness, chain
of command, discipline and communication capabilities, in spite of its alleged
financial constraints and the loss of control of the port city of Kismaayo in the
Lower Juba region of Somalia. However, it is not clear if the merger with Al-Qaida
on 9 February 2012 had merely a symbolic impact on the organization or enhanced
its expertise and resources. Although the current Al-Qaida leader, Ayman
Al-Zawahiri, expressed his support for Al-Shabaab operations in Somalia once again
in an audio message of 7 November 2012 and in video footage on 6 April 2013, the
organization remains largely self-sufficient. In particular, links to Al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula, as described in the previous report of the Monitoring Group,
remained more institutional than operational.2
14. The Monitoring Group also understands that Al-Shabaab has compiled and
hidden in arms caches important stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions,
proportionately distributed all over southern and central Somalia, awaiting the
withdrawal of international forces to conduct a multiple-front offensive against the
Federal Government of Somalia and its allied militias, and regional administrations.
15. Following the departure of ENDF and its proxies from El Bur, in the Galgadud
region, and Hudur, in the Bakol region, Al-Shabaab captured these towns on 11 June
2012 and 17 March 2013, respectively. These takeovers illustrate not only the
inability of the Federal Government of Somalia and its associated militias to control
any ground without international support, but also the capacity of Al-Shabaab to
readily recover lost territory.
16. Al-Shabaab has not launched any major attacks against AMISOM or forces of
the Federal Government since the “Ramadan offensive” in August-September 2010,
and almost systematically avoids direct military confrontation, even in towns of
strategic importance such as Kismaayo. Consequently, Al-Shabaab has preserved the
core of its fighting force and resources, devoting only a part of its capacities and
manpower to asymmetrical warfare.
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2See S/2012/544, annex 2.2, para. 12.
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17. Furthermore, internal dissensions have had no impact on the ability of
Al-Shabaab to conduct operations in Somalia. Disagreements over power sharing
and resources, which invariably cause tensions among the top leaders, are dealt with
at the highest level of the shura (council). A broad sense of unity is maintained in
the organization by calls to arms to maintain constant pressure on AMISOM, federal
and regional security forces and their allied militias, and by employing guerrillatype
tactics, techniques and procedures. Nevertheless, a scenario in which the
Al-Shabaab military structure dissolves into its component factions cannot be ruled
out.
18. In this context, Ahmed Godane’s leadership of Al-Shabaab remains largely
unchallenged. He has reportedly strengthened his direct control of the Amniyat,
known as the “secret service” of Al-Shabaab. Financial and technical resources are
increasingly concentrated in the Amniyat and it commands the attention of Godane,
who seems to be neglecting the military apparatus and its leaders, possibly as a
result of public disagreements over strategy and objectives. Amniyat functions
mostly independently from the rest of Al-Shabaab, through its own chain of
command, logistics network and financial resources. It therefore has the capacity to
operate discretely, gather intelligence and strike effectively throughout Somalia,
specifically in areas under AMISOM/Federal Government of Somalia control,
spreading fear even within Al-Shabaab.19. However, Godane is facing a new wave of public discontent from within the
shura. On 29 April 2013, a fatwa was published online, allegedly instigated by
Mukhtar Robow, Hassan Dahir Aweys, Ibrahim “Al-Afghani”, Zubair “Al-Muhajir”
and Mo’alim Burhan, condemning attempts to assassinate Omar Hammami, a.k.a.
“Abu Mansour Al-Amriki”, and declaring that “there is no obedience to the Emir if
it is an act of disobedience to Allah”.3
20. Some of these leaders, represented by Robow and Aweys, are considered to be
part of the nationalistic wing of Al-Shabaab, yet they confronted Godane in defence
of “Al-Amriki”, today still the main public figure of the international jihadist
movement in Somalia. Therefore, to interpret divisions within Al-Shabaab in binary
terms — between nationalists and internationalists — is misleading and simplistic.
Al-Shabaab has always had a primarily national focus and its internal situation is
quite complex.
21. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group had access to a wide range of
sources on Al-Shabaab, including confidential daily intelligence reports, classified
analytical reports and confidential security reports from international organizations
and non-governmental and private actors. In particular, the Monitoring Group
interviewed Al-Shabaab defectors and prisoners in Somalia, who provided first-hand
testimonies about the organization, its structure and modus operandi.
22. Annex 1.1 includes two maps depicting the evolution of Al-Shabaab’s areas of
influence and control in southern and central Somalia between 30 August 2012 and
6 May 2013, and a breakdown of security incidents related to Al-Shabaab activity in
Somalia.
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3 “Fatwa regarding the attempt to assassinate Abu Mansour al-Amriki”, accessed at
http://aljahad.com/vb/index.php on 30 April 2013. Reportedly, “Al Afghani” and Sheikh Aweys
have also individually and publicly criticized Godane’s leadership, in a letter to Ayman
al-Zawahiri on 10 April 2013 and an audio message on the situation in Somalia on 17 May 2013.
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23. Annex 1.2 outlines the three main components of Al-Shabaab’s structure: first,
its political body, the shura; second, its military component, which is on the
defensive but still significant; and third, its clandestine service, the Amniyat, which
is increasingly responsible for the acts threatening peace, security and stability in
the areas under the control of AMISOM and Government of Somalia security forces,
their allied militias and regional administrations.
24. Annex 1.3 describes the recruitment and training capacities of Al-Shabaab.
25. Annex 1.4 assesses the current status of foreign fighters within the
organization, and the tension between Al-Shabaab’s public image in the jihadist
community and the reality of isolation experienced by foreign fighters who join the
organization in Somalia.
26. Annex 1.5 documents the tactics, techniques and procedures of Al-Shabaab.
27. Annex 1.6 presents the media strategy of Al-Shabaab.
28. Annex 1.7 includes a case study of the presence and operations of Al-Shabaab in
“Puntland”, where it constitutes the main challenge to peace, security and stability.
B. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat
29. Since the previous report of the Monitoring Group (S/2012/544), issued in July
2012, Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Centre, has suffered
significant setbacks, as has its ally Al-Shabaab. The setbacks experienced by
Al Hijra have impeded the threat capacity of Al-Shabaab in East Africa and affected
the strategic-operational link between the two groups.4 While Al-Shabaab
experienced military reverses in Somalia, across the border in Kenya, Al Hijra
members were plagued by unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous “catch
and release” arrest raids and operational disruptions under the “Al-Shabaab/East
Africa Al-Qaida Disruption Initiative”.5 For instance, on 27 August 2012, the
ideological leader of Al Hijra, Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed, was inexplicably
killed in Mombasa, Kenya, a month after the Committee designated him for targeted
measures.6 In addition, active Al Hijra members who have disappeared include one
of its “Amirs”, Sylvester Opiyo (a.k.a. “Musa Osodo”), in May 2012 and seniorfigures such as Jeremiah Onyango Okumu and Steven Mwanzia Osaka (a.k.a. “Duda
Black” and “Duda Brown”, respectively) in June 2012.7
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4S/2012/544, annex 3.1 (strictly confidential). Credible testimonies from serving and former
Al Hijra fighters and documents attributed to senior Al-Shabaab figures, such as Ibrahim
al-Afghani, have indicated that Al-Shabaab expected to exploit its strong ties with extremist
groups in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania to facilitate its external operations. See
also www.sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/12/feature-01.
5 The Monitoring Group is aware of an initiative funded by the Government of the United States,
called “Al-Shabaab/East Africa Al-Qaida Disruption Initiative” whose purpose is to assist East
African security services in combating terrorism.
6While the extent of his involvement remains unclear, Aboud Rogo seems linked to the United
Kingdom national Michael Olumide Adebolajo, who is accused of killing a British service
officer on 22 May 2013.
7www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-human-rights-abuseskenyauganda-20130403.pdf. Credible evidence suggests that Al Hijra members who have
disappeared or been inexplicably killed were indirectly linked to attacks or assisted in the
recruitment of non-Somali Kenyans to join Al-Shabaab.
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30. Towards the end of 2012, Al Hijra’s difficulties became more evident and were
compounded by the fractious state of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its loss of
Kismaayo, a known Al Hijra area of operation. Not only was Al Hijra’s ability to
radicalize and recruit new fighters to be sent to Somalia weakened, but its
operational ability to pursue its declared war inside Kenya on behalf and in support
of Al-Shabaab declined. One Al Hijra fighter claimed that a number of his fellow
combatants returning to Kenya had become anxious about the lack of effective
coordination between Al-Shabaab and Al Hijra’s “Amir” based in Somalia, Ahmad
Iman Ali.8
31. Despite the setbacks, Al Hijra, like Al-Shabaab, is striving to remain a credible
threat to peace and security both in Somalia and outside. As an operational priority,
it is strengthening its ties to the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in the United Republic
of Tanzania9 as part of Al-Shabaab’s broader external campaign. It is also
establishing strong logistical links to Al-Shabaab affiliates in Rwanda and
Burundi.10
32. The lingering influence and leadership of Ahmad Iman, also Al-Shabaab’s
representative for Kenya, inspired a wave of attacks by grenade and improvised
explosive device across Kenya, mostly against the local population. While this
approach has had marginal success, both Al-Shabaab and Ahmad Iman have
repeatedly called from Somalia for sustained attacks in the region and particularly in
Kenya.11
33. Probably owing to its limited success and the rather kinetic approach to
counter-terrorism taken by the Kenyan security services, Al Hijra, in partnership
with the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in the United Republic of Tanzania, has sought
operational direction and guidance since the latter part of 2012 from individuals
with former ties to Al-Qaida in East Africa and self-styled Al-Qaida affiliates,
including Abubakar Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi” and United Kingdom national
Jermaine John Grant.12 “Makaburi” has exerted a growing influence over Al Hijra
and is determined to redirect the group’s resources and manpower from hitting “soft
targets” to conducting complex, large-scale attacks in Kenya on behalf and in
support of Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, Jermaine John Grant, confined in prison, has
effectively provided assistance, albeit remotely, to ongoing plots involving both
Al Hijra and “Makaburi”.
34. Over the years, Al Hijra in Kenya and its Somalia-based fighters have proven
adept at mobilizing resources for Al-Shabaab activities in Somalia and the region.
As detailed previously by the Monitoring Group,13 the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque
Committee has played a clandestine role and continues to provide financial support
to Al Hijra, particularly its fighters returning from Somalia to Kenya. In some cases,
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8Confidential report dated 20 January 2013 describing, inter alia, the experiences of Al Hijra
fighters based in Somalia, archived with the United Nations..